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I. Introduction 
The concept of the self is one which is at once puzzling, as well as vastly important in the 
most personal sense to the experiences we undergo as human beings as well as the way we 
receive and process sensory information from the external world. Selfhood, or the idea of an 
existent self seems inseparable from our existence in both a profoundly abstract and scientifically 
concrete sense. In the 17th century Descartes posited mind body dualism to explain the existence 
of the self, giving birth to the infamous concept of something akin to a “ghost in the machine”. 
Descartes, Locke, and other contemporaries created this concept by positing the self as a sort of 
immaterial soul which resides in or above the body, and by means of some mysterious form of 
communication, controls the body much in the way a puppet master would control her dolls. This 
vision of the self as an immaterial substance which is something more than just the physical body 
is one which has strong intuitive pull. The idea that we cannot simply be boiled down to 
randomly firing neurotransmitters conforms to the strong intuition held by most that what it 
means to be me, or have a self, is something which is a great deal more profound than the 
physical capabilities of my body. This intuition is brought out famously by the philosopher John 
Locke in the scenario known as the “Prince and the Cobbler.” In this scenario there exist a prince 
and a cobbler who undergo a brain swap scenario in which the entire psychologies of the prince 
and the cobbler are swapped. Suppose that pervious to the swap, the prince committed a heinous 
crime; also suppose that the prince knew that the swap was going to occur, and planned to use the 
swap to evade prosecution. When the guards arrive to take the prince to jail, they take away the 
princes body, despite the fact that “the person” who is inside the prince is actually the 
psychology of the cobbler. When we evaluate our intuitions concerning this scenario it seems as 
though there has been a gross miscarriage of justice, the “person” who should be punished is the 
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scheming individual who now resides in the body of the cobbler, as that is the consciousness that 
knowingly committed the crime. As such, as is illustrated by the manipulation of our sense of 
morality concerning the “perpetrator” of the crime in the scenario described above, it seems as 
though there is a great deal more to the self than the mere physical body. However, the idea of 
the self as something immaterial which communicates directly, (by some unknown sense) with a 
physical body located squarely in space and time, seems distinctly unscientific, is not (and 
perhaps never could be) empirically verifiable, nor is it observable in any sense. These 
shortcomings make mind-body dualism a theory which is easily dismissed as implausible due to 
a lack of any sort of scientific foundation.      
  The idea of an existent self however, is not constrained to the realm of mind body 
dualism, and it is not only in an abstract sense that we form an idea of ourselves. As Dennett 
points out in his “Origin of Selves” (Dennett, 1989) there is an inherently recognizable 
distinction between “the self” and “the other” which is a deeply rooted biological principle. This 
principle is so central to our existence and the existence of the other creatures with which we 
share this earth, that it is an implicitly foundational principle to evolutionary theory. Specifically, 
in order to ensure our survival, (leading to the survival of species) there must be some boundary 
between the self and the other so that we may act according to self preservation, ensuring our 
survival, and the survival of our genes through reproduction.  Put more simply, we must be able 
to make the distinction between “us and them,” the internal and the external, if we are to make it 
very far in the race for survival. Again, here we have a way of classifying the self, which 
includes some of our intuitions, (namely that the idea of self ought to have some empirically 
scientific roots, and answer some of our questions about why exactly the idea of self is so 
essentially important to human experience) but again falls short in that it seems there is 
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something profound about the self or “what it means to be me” that goes beyond the skeleton of 
strictly scientific theory.  
  As we can see, it seems clear that selfhood plays an integral role our concept of human 
experience, in both a profoundly abstract as well as foundationally concrete sense. It will be a 
goal of this paper however, to argue that the age old epistemological pursuit of “what it means” 
to have a persistent self is ultimately unimportant; and that there may not be (strictly speaking) 
any fact of the matter about whether selves exist or not. Further, this paper will take for granted 
that which has been assumed by Derek Parfit concerning the self as a persistent being1and work 
within this framework to address the important questions of what it means to have a self at any 
one temporal moment; as well as whether it is possible to have a singular self which persists 
through time. It will be the aim of this paper to argue that these two questions are inextricably 
linked, and that the answer to one entails the solution to the other, namely that the reality of 
selfhood (at any given moment in time) ensures that a “persistent self” is an impossibility.  
At first glance, it may seem that to claim that there may be no fact of the matter about 
whether selves exist or not, is one which is nothing short of absurd, however it will be the goal of 
this paper to convince the reader that this is indeed the case. I do not wish to make the claim the 
vision or idea of the self does not matter, but rather that there is no profound truth about whether 
selves exist factually. It is instead it is the appearance of selves which is of importance in the 
debate surrounding selfhood. I will argue that past the surface of appearances, there is no deep 
fact of the matter concerning the self nor is it particularly metaphysically interesting to engage in 
the conversation of whether selves exist in factual reality. 
  In order to illustrate my point to the fullest extent it is helpful to consider a distinction 
                                                          
1
 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapters 10-13, p.199-306. 
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between the immediate world of experience, and the possibility of the existence of a removed 
metaphysical world containing the realities of things in themselves. Specifically, the immediate 
world can be supposed to contain all objects of experience, (objects, events, subjective 
experiences) which we experience through the veil of our subjective sensibilities and intuitions. 
Contrarily, the metaphysical world can be imagined to contain “things in themselves” or the 
metaphysical realities of the way things are, sans our human perceptions of the events in 
question. It is my claim that the objective truth about whether or not there are “selves” falls into 
the realm of something akin to the metaphysical world described above. Specifically, because of 
the realities and limitations of our brains there is an insurmountable epistemological gap between 
the so called “reality of selfhood” and the appearance of selfhood we all have. In short, we will 
never be able to turn an objective eye to what selfhood entails because we simply cannot get past 
the subjective veil of our own selfhood to do so. However, as it turns out, rather than some 
objective truth, it is the appearance of the self we all develop which is of metaphysical 
importance. This is of the central role our vision of selfhood plays in the way we experience the 
world, the way we process external information, and the way it affects the formation of our 
desires, intentions and subsequent actions. Therefore the following sections of this paper will 
attempt an examination of the central tenets of the universal picture of selfhood, and further 
show why investigating the appearance of the self is a metaphysically worthwhile pursuit.  
II. Unity of Consciousness 
Although there are many aspects of selfhood that may be considered foundational to our 
idea of the self, for the purposes of the present paper, a focus will be maintained upon the so-
called “unity of consciousness” that many of us consider to be at the center of our vision of the 
self. The theory of unity of consciousness attempts to explain the sense of unity we have 
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concerning our conscious mental states, as well as our sense of ownership over our mental states. 
Take the example of my first college class: during my first college class I enjoyed many different 
phenomenal states; specifically I entertained the visual experiences of eagerly examining my 
fellow classmates, registering the professor at the front of the room, and taking in the details of 
how the classroom appeared to me. During this time I simultaneously experienced auditory 
sensations such as those of listening to my professor giving her class lecture, listening to the 
comments of my classmates, and so on. Finally, also during this time, I experienced emotional 
and cognitive sensations of various kinds, such as thinking critically about what the professor 
was saying, feeling excitement and anxiety about being in my first college class, as well as a 
deep awareness of my sense of self and of how I was presenting myself to my peers—I wanted to 
come off as smart and intelligent without being pretentious or conceited, quick witted without 
being the class clown, and so on and so forth. Through this description of my first college class, 
one can begin to understand what unity of consciousness entails: the unity of all of my 
simultaneous experiences rolled into one subjective experience: that of my first college class.  
Timothy Bayne (Bayne, 2008) famously described phenomenal unity of consciousness as 
the experience of “what it is like” to be me. We can see how unity of consciousness is necessary 
for understanding our subjective experiences as well as the subjective experiences of others 
because unity of consciousness consolidates our experiences in such a way that there is 
something it would “be like” to have them. Another way of thinking about unity of 
consciousness, concerns the sense of ownership we have over our subjective experiences. The 
experience of my first college class is something I share with no one, it is entirely and completely 
mine because there is only one “me” or one mind which underwent the actual experience of my 
first college class, there are not two or three other “selves” which have had parts of the 
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experience of my first college class but rather just the one “me” who has. Despite the seemingly 
obvious nature concerning ownership of our mental states, this ownership has been contested 
several times in debates concerning unity of consciousness. 
  If there were no exceptions to the rule of singly unified ownership over our subjective 
experiences then we could happily conclude that what matters in the debate about selfhood 
concerns whether the subject is able to entertain phenomenally unified personal experiences and 
leave it at that. However there has been great debate since the early 1970’s about whether or not 
our vision of the self as a unified consciousness is actually coherent. This debate often centers 
around neuropsychological discoveries concerning bi-hemispheric communication between the 
right and left hemispheres in the brain, and the strange psychological phenomena that occurs 
when the corpus callosum is severed. During the 1960’s brain bisection operations were 
sometimes performed as a last ditch effort to attempt to control the seizures of severely epileptic 
patients. In brain bisection operations the corpus callosum, (a strand of neurons which connects 
the right and left hemispheres allowing for communication within the brain) is cut, the goal being 
to stop epileptic seizures from spreading from the left to the right (or vice versa) lobes of the 
brain. For a long time it was assumed that these operations had no effect on the patient other than 
effects desired due to the fact that patients would continue their normal lives exhibiting no signs 
of impaired functioning. However sometime later, experiments done using brain bisected 
patients told a somewhat different story, leading psychologists and philosophers to speak of a 
“dual consciousness” in brain bisected patients. The facts concerning brain functioning are as 
follows: the left hemisphere is associated with the right side of the body, while the right 
hemisphere is associated with the left side, as such tactile stimuli and sensations are transmitted 
contralaterally. Visual stimuli are also transmitted contralaterally in that the left half of each 
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retina (which scans the right half of each visual field) sends information to the left hemisphere, 
while the right half of each retina, (scanning the left half of the visual field) sends information to 
the right hemisphere. Further, the left hemisphere is associated with the control and production 
of speech. Laboratory experiments making use of such knowledge concerning brain functioning 
have been conducted on split brain patients with surprising results. These results are summarized 
by Nagel (Nagel, 1971) in his paper “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness” and are as 
follows: in brain bisected patients,  
“What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the right hand can be reported 
verbally. What is flashed to the left half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the left hand cannot be 
reported verbally. However, if the word “hat” is flashed on the left the left hand will retrieve a hat from a 
group of concealed objects if the person is told to pick out what he has seen. At the same time he will 
insist verbally that he saw nothing” (Nagel, 1971, p. 400).  
  This strange behavior seems to indicate a dual consciousness, or the development of 2 
separate consciousnesses residing inside a single body, immediately raising concerns about the 
extent to which we can confidently attribute a single countable mind to such patients. Indeed, 
such experiments have lead some philosophers to question whether unity of consciousness is 
something we can confidently attribute even to normal individuals due to the fact that it seems 
highly unlikely that experimental conditions can elicit (from an otherwise normally functioning 
individual) a new consciousness to spring into existence and then equally quickly disappear once 
the individual goes back to daily life. Indeed, the results from such experiments make it seem 
rather more likely that we have made an error in assuming that “the self” we all have is a single 
unified global consciousness which subsumes all of our mental states creating a larger cohesive 
unit. 
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  However, there is something distinctly disconcerting about the idea of sharing our body 
with multiple “selves” or unities of consciousness, and there is a strong intuitive pull towards any 
viewpoint which posits only one “self” operating at a time, certainly this is what it feels like is 
going on. Indeed to refer to the point made by Timothy Bayne, it does not seem as though there 
is anything it would “be like” to share one’s body with multiple competing selves which operate 
simultaneously. Therefore, how do we reconcile the appearance of selfhood with the logical 
inconsistencies raised by such problems as brain bisection or other strange psychological 
phenomena? I will defend make the claim that something akin to the successive selves theory 
described by Parfit in his book “Reasons and Persons” (Parfit, 1984) is the closest we can hope 
to come to explaining the appearance of the self. Not only does the successive selves theory 
provide a coherent response to the logical problem raised by brain bisection experiments, it also 
provides a coherent answer to the puzzling question of how we manage to stay the same person 
over time even though quite literally everything about us changes.  
III. Successive Selves 
The version of the successive self view I wish to defend plays out as follows: with every 
change in mental state, sensory input, or cognitive processing, the “self” we identify with as a 
person changes, in this way each cohesive self (all possessing an instantaneous unity of 
consciousness) passes out of existence as quickly as each “new” self comes into being to replace 
the previous self. In short, every moment (conscious or unconscious) long enough for us to 
formulate an awareness of our existence is presided over by a selfhood, one which is replaced by 
a new selfhood the next instant. Each of these successive selves has as much claim to “who we 
are” as the previous, but is the most relevant to our idea of selfhood in the moment in which each 
self is in immediate existence. However, it is not this instantaneous “unity of consciousness” 
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which matters in the idea of selfhood, but rather the connection between each successive self. 
The connection between selves has to do with a kind of continuity of mental states rather than 
simply the continuation of the physical body. However, selves that have passed out of immediate 
existence many years ago have a different kind of connection to the currently presiding self than 
do those who are passing out of immediate existence as I speak. Here Parfit’s distinction between 
psychological continuity and psychological connectedness is helpful. Specifically Parfit states 
that psychological connectedness refers to “the holding of particular direct psychological 
connections” (Parfit, 1984, p.206) as such psychological connectedness is a transitive relation 
and can hold to a matter of degree. This differs from psychological continuity which Parfit 
defines as the “holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness” (Parfit, 1984, p. 206). 
This distinction is extremely helpful when discussing the relationships between successive selves 
because it helps to illustrate their relevance to the self at hand. Specifically, my current self is 
psychologically continuous with the immediately previous selves because there is a strong and 
overlapping connection between the present and immediately previous selves which orients me 
to the continuous and uninterrupted flow of daily life that I am accustomed to. However this 
strong relation does not hold between my present self and the self I was at some moment 13 
years prior. However, there is some relation there, which allows me to refer to the person I was at 
that moment 13 years prior as me. This relation holds because the self I was at some moment 13 
years prior is psychologically connected with the present self to some degree by virtue of the 
transitivity principle of psychological connection. 
 Due to the fleeting nature of the “unity of consciousness” that is in charge in each 
moment, what actually matters when we discuss selfhood are the various psychological relations 
we have to each of our successive selves. When this view is adopted we can explain the 
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appearance of selfhood solving the puzzling issue of our persistence across time as well as 
dealing with brain bi-section. Successive selves provides a solution to the brain bi-section 
problem because it shifts the focus away from considering one global and time expansive unity 
of consciousness as “the real me” and places emphasis instead on the connections that hold 
between successive instantaneous unities, therefore allowing us to attribute the strange 
discrepancies that occur in the behavior of brain bisected patients to malfunctioning in the 
physical brain rather than a strange “dualility of unified consciousness” or  simultaneously 
operating selves. Indeed, even further support for this is provided by information gleaned from 
some of the laboratory experiments conducted upon split brain patients when the right 
hemisphere is faced with a communication problem. Dennett brings our attention to the 
resourcefulness of some brain bisected patients in his paper “The Self as a Center of Narrative 
Gravity” (Dennett, 1992).  Experiments have been conducted where split brain subjects must 
reach into a closed bag with the left hand to feel an object which they are then asked to identify 
verbally, because of the removal of the communication link between hemispheres, the right 
hemisphere gets information about the object from the left hand, but the left hemisphere, (which 
controls speech) is kept in the dark, therefore the patient is unable to publicly announce what has 
been felt in the bag. However, there is a solution to this communication problem which some 
split brain patients have been observed to discover. As quoted by Dennett 
“Whereas ordinary tactile sensations are represented contralaterally, pain signals are represented 
ipsilaterally (meaning pain sensations go to both hemispheres) suppose the object in the bag is a pencil. 
The right hemisphere will sometimes hit upon a very clever tactic: hold the pencil in your left hand so its 
point is pressed hard into the palm; this creates pain letting the left hemisphere know there’s something 
sharp in the bag, which is enough of a hint that it can begin guessing; the right hemisphere will then 
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signal “getting warmer” and “got it” signals by smiling or other controllable signs and in a very short time 
the subject will be able to announce the correct answer” (Dennett, 1992). 
As such it seems as though these experiments reveal a talent for overcoming accessibility 
and communication problems in patients who have impaired brain functioning. When applied to 
the theory of successive selves it would seem as though the unified self “in charge” at a 
particular moment is experiencing difficulty (due to physical damage) in creating a cohesive 
story for the present experiences of the patient at hand. However, due to the resourcefulness of 
the brain and our determination to force a unity into our experiences it is possible for the self at 
hand (by means of clues and hints given) to combine fragments of a phenomenal experience 
together in such a way that allows us to maintain the appearance of unity—much in the same 
way we have the appearance of a persistent expansive unified consciousness despite the passing 
in and out of existence of successive selves. This is because it is a psychological tendency to 
create unity where perhaps no one appears, or to organize our life experiences into a unified 
story.  
IV. Psychological Tendencies and the “Narrative Self” 
The question which now becomes relevant is: why are we so invested in this “unified 
story”? As indicated above, it is more likely that what really matters in the appearance of the self 
is the relationships between present selves rather than the appearance of a single, expansive 
unified consciousness. So why do we find ourselves preoccupied with such a self? I will argue 
that there is nothing more to this intuition than a psychological tendency to view ourselves as a 
unified, consistent, and pervasive unit which persists through time. However this tendency has 
no metaphysical depth other than it is useful for us to think of ourselves in this manner, it helps 
us make sense of our lives, develop an idea of who “we really are” and aids in our ability to form 
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relationships and communicate with others around us. However the idea of a persistent self is 
nothing short of an abstraction which has a psychologically intuitive pull. As seen above, 
logically what seems to matter about the appearance of a self is a relationship that connects 
“selves” or present mental states; however we don’t necessarily like to think of ourselves in this 
way. The reason for our belief in the self as a persistent unity of consciousness has been artfully 
illustrated in a useful analogy coined by Dennett (Dennett, 1992). Dennett draws a helpful 
parallel between an object’s “center of gravity” and our “narrative selves” which I believe, 
allows us to see the true function of the appearance of a persistent self. Specifically, a center of 
gravity is a concept of Newtonian physics that has an established place both in the theory and 
language of science. It figures into explanations that appear to be causal in nature—“why doesn’t 
the lamp fall over?” “Because its center of gravity is so low”—however, a center of gravity 
cannot be found anywhere, it occupies no spatio-temporal location, has no physical properties to 
speak of, and does not resemble any other physical object in space. Indeed, to try and pinpoint 
where exactly an object’s center of gravity is located would be to make a category error, one 
would not look at a lamp on a table and ask “but where exactly is its center of gravity?” to do so 
would be absurd. In this sense, a center of gravity is like the idea of a conscious and persistent 
unified self, it is an abstraction, a fiction or “causal story” used in an offhand way to offer a 
coherent explanation for the events of our daily lives, but in reality is a somewhat empty notion.  
I propose that this narrative “center of gravity” or self, is constantly changing an updated 
version of which is available with every new successive self or change in mental state. In our 
daily lives this change is gradual, we do not notice a shift in our “narrative figurehead” from one 
moment to the next, however if we look back on who we were five or ten years ago, we find that 
there is often a great discrepancy between who we identify with now and who we felt we were 
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then. This discrepancy is tangible and can be attributed to the different relationships our 
presiding narrative self shares with previous selves. Specifically, as mentioned above, the 
relationship between my current “self” and those immediately previous is much stronger than 
that which holds between my present self and that of some moment 5 years ago. This is due to 
the level of psychological connectedness present between each of the selves in question. The 
level of overlap between my current self and those immediately previous is very high, a direct 
connection of psychological continuity, however the relationship between myself now and 
myself 5 years ago is direct only because such a relationship is transitive, and the level of overlap 
is low or nonexistent. Therefore, it is natural that the constant change in my narrative self that 
occurs daily seems somewhat seamless, and offers no interruption to daily life.  
The claim that our narrative self changes literally from one mental state to the next is not 
a weak claim. I am proposing that in a very real sense our vision of what constitutes a self ceases 
to exist and is replaced by a new and updated narrative, or to be put more simply, each narrative 
self dies and is replaced by a brand new updated self constantly throughout the course of our 
lives. As such, a common intuitive reaction to such a proposal is to object to it on the grounds 
that we certainly would notice if, rather than being a persistent being, or having a single unified 
self which stretches across time, we were instead merely a collection of instantaneous and every 
changing narrative figureheads. Certainly, it will be objected, there is a distinct enough 
difference between the death of a self, and its continued existence, that each option is describing 
profoundly different outcomes. However I will argue that the two options are merely 
semantically different ways of describing one and the same outcome, that there is no deep 
metaphysical fact of the matter which makes the death of a self or its continued existence, vastly 
different scenarios. 
Hanniball, 14 
 
In order to make this claim, it is important to understand that my proposal is reductionist 
in that it is my belief that in some scenarios concerning personal identity there may be no 
objective fact of the matter about whether a self is existent at a particular moment, or whether it 
has ceased to exist. To put it more simply, there may be scenarios involving personal identity 
where it makes the most sense to claim that the identity of the thing or “self” in question is 
distinctly indeterminate in a most unpuzzling way. It may be hard to understand this type of 
abstract claim without the help of a somewhat more concrete example, as such it will be helpful 
to consider Parfit’s club example to make the claim more apparent, the scenario is as follows:   
“Suppose that a certain club exists for several years, holding regular meetings. The meetings then 
cease. Some years later, some of the members of this club form a club with the same name, and 
the same rules.” (Parfit, 1984, p. 213). 
The question we may ask ourselves concerning the nature of this club is: have these 
people reconvened the very same club? Or have they instead formed a new club which is exactly 
similar? It is possible that there is some definitive answer to this question, it may be that the club 
has some rule built into its structure concerning how long it may be disbanded and may be still 
called the same club upon its reinstatement, however it is equally likely that the club has no such 
rule and that, when asked, the members of the club wouldn’t give it a definitive answer. It would 
seem then that there would be no real answer to the question “is this the same club.” And that 
either claim concerning the status of the alleged club would be neither true nor false. Put more 
simply, there is no fact of the matter concerning the correct status of the club, because both the 
claim “this is the same club” and “this is a different club” are simply semantically different ways 
of describing one and the same outcome. In much the same way, I believe there is something 
indeterminate about the nature of our identity. Specifically, a self passing out of existence and 
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being replaced by another, and the continued existence of a persistent and cohesive self are 
simply semantically different ways of describing the same outcome. Because of our inability to 
ever get outside of our own brains to examine selfhood objectively, we cannot know whether 
there would be a perceptually significant difference in our lives if we existed as a bundle of 
successive selves all connected by some kind of direct relation, or if we existed as a continually 
coherent overarching and persistent self. However, as shown above, it logically makes more 
sense to accept the former view. Whether or not there is a fact of the matter about the entity of 
the self may not have a coherent answer, however the idea we have of some kind of selfhood is a 
psychologically useful tool for helping us navigate our lives and our relationships with others. 
Finally, the question of whether or not we would notice the death of one self and the “birth” of 
another seems to be a somewhat indeterminate question, where there is no metaphysically 
profound difference between the “life” or “death” of a self because both options are simply two 
different ways of describing the same outcome. 
V. Conclusions 
As such, the concept of selfhood is one which is vitally important to us from a 
psychological perspective because it is through the lens of the self that we view our world, 
navigate our lives, and create our narrative stories. Despite the importance of the concept of “the 
self,” because of the logical constraints we are faced with (namely our inability to obtain an 
objective standpoint when regarding the concept of ourselves) we will never be able to 
conclusively discover whether “selves” actually exist as things in themselves, I think it doubtful 
that they do and find it more persuasive that the concept of selfhood is nothing more than a 
psychological tendency. Despite this, the appearance of the self is something worth 
investigating. As I hope to have shown in this paper, the intuitive idea we have of the self as a 
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persistent and ever changing entity is actually not what matters when we are talking about our 
vision of selfhood. Instead, it is logically more likely that we are a bundle of successive selves 
connected by some direct relation, and it is actually the relation, rather than the unified 
consciousness, which is important when we are discussing selves. Further, the difference 
between the passing out of and passing into existence of a self, does not describe some deep 
metaphysical difference but rather simply is two different ways of describing one and the same 
outcome. Although at first disturbing, I believe this should give us a somewhat more optimistic 
outlook upon the time when we pass out of existence entirely, because perhaps it will not be as 
final as once thought, but rather a continuation of the cycle of selfhood, continued without a 
physical vessel. 
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